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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CITY OF ROY, ; 
Plaintiff-Appellee, ] 
vs. ; 
MELVIN MURPHY, ] 
Defendant-Appellant. ; 
i Case No. 920088 CA 
i Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of driving under the 
influence of alcohol, a class B misdemeanor, under § 41-6-44 Utah 
Code Annotated (1953). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (d) (f) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issue is presented by the defendant for 
review: 
1. Should the testimony of Roy City paramedic-emt Eric 
Froerer have been allowed regarding his observations and 
conversation with the Defendant? 
Appellee does not dispute the standard of review set forth 
in appellant's brief. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, 
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or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on 
appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Melvin Murphy was charged with driving under the 
influence of alcohol, a class B misdemeanor, under § 41-6-44 Utah 
Code Annotated (1953). 
The defendant requested a jury trial. At the trial on 
January 14, 1992, the City Attorney called paramedic Eric Froerer 
as a witness. Defendant objected. The trial court allowed 
paramedic Froerer to testify. A jury later convicted the defendant 
of driving under the influence. Mr. Murphy was sentenced the same 
date as follows: 90 days jail with all but 88 suspended; 
completion of 60 hours community service; completion of an alcohol 
program through Rocky Mountain Consultants; consume no alcohol or 
drugs illegally during probation; attend a minimum of one 
Alcoholics Anonymous meeting per week; finally, to pay a fine and 
assessment of $700.00. He was placed on probation for a term of 18 
months. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant has provided the Court with a limited transcript 
relating only to paramedic Eric Froerer's testimony; therefore, the 
statement of facts will be limited to that testimony. 
Paramedic Eric Froerer arrived at the scene of an accident 
involving defendant's station wagon and a stationary semitractor-
trailer (Tr. p.8). Paramedic Froerer testified that his training 
would be similar to a licensed practical nurse (LPN) (Tr. p.10). 
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He stated upon arrival at the accident scene, his responsibility-
was patient care (Tr. p. 10). Once he made contact with the 
defendant he commenced to assess the defendant's consciousness (Tr. 
p.13). The defendant was later removed from his station wagon and 
carried on a back board to a Roy City Ambulance (Tr. p. 12, 13). 
Paramedic Froerer rode with the defendant in the rear compartment 
of the ambulance on the way to the hospital. (Tr. p. 18). 
Paramedic Froerer stated that the defendant was not under arrest at 
the time of his transport. On the way to the hospital, paramedic 
Froerer had a conversation with the defendant (Tr. p. 17, 18). 
Paramedic Froerer smelled a strong odor of alcohol coming from the 
defendant's breath (Tr. p. 16, 17). The defendant was asked by 
paramedic Froerer whether he had been drinking alcohol (Tr. p.18). 
Paramedic Froerer testified in his opinion the defendant was 
intoxicated (Tr. p. 19) . He testified that while the defendant was 
confused, he attributed his confusion to his intoxication (Tr. p. 
24) . Paramedic Froerer testified that the defendant was conscious 
and responsive (Tr. p. 28). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Paramedic Froerer is not a physician or surgeon subject to 
a confidential relationship (Tr. p.9) and 78-24-8 (4) Utah Code 
Ann. The privilege relating to the physician-patient privilege 
states it applies to civil proceedings and does not indicate an 
inclusion of criminal proceedings. The only testimony relating to 
the defendant's arrest was paramedic's Froerer's testimony that he 
was not under arrest, thus not invoking the requirements of 
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Miranda. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Paramedic 
Froerer was not under the control of the police or acting as their 
agent. The statute cited by defendant relating to confidential 
disclosure, 26-25-1, Utah Code Ann. is not applicable to Paramedic 
Froererfs conversation with the defendant. Finally, defendant 
bears the burden of showing on appeal the error supported by the 
record. Defendant has failed to provide this Court with sufficient 
transcript to support his challenge. This Court should sustain the 
trial court's ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT PARAMEDIC FROERER 
WAS AN INDIVIDUAL WITH WHOM THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT 
PRIVILEGE APPLIES 
The statute applying to privileged communications is 
focused upon physicians or surgeons. It is not an all-inclusive 
medical privilege. The statute was not drafted to exclude 
testimony from a paramedic in a criminal case. 
Defendant asserts he had the right to invoke a medical 
privilege. Utah law is not so broad to recognize a medical 
privilege. The statute is 78-24-8(4) Utah Code Ann. which states 
in part, "A physician or surgeon cannot, without the consent of his 
patient, be examined in a civil action as to any information 
acquired in attending the patient which was necessary to enable him 
to prescribe or act for the patient." This privilege is a creation 
of statute. Other courts have held that this privilege did not 
exist at common law and therefore should be strictly construed. 
See State v. Sanders, 833 P.2d 452 (Wash. App. 1992), People v. 
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District Court In & For the City & County of Denver. 743 P.2d 432 
(Col. 1987). 
The first analysis is whether Paramedic Froerer would 
qualify as a physician. He testified he is clearly not trained or 
educated to a physician's level (Tr. 8-10). The statute states 
that the privilege applies only to a "physician or surgeon." 78-
24-8(4) Utah Code Ann. Other states have held in similar 
situations where paramedic EMTs have responded to accidents and 
conversed with injured parties that the physician-patient privilege 
was not applicable. State v. Cahoon, 799 P.2d 1191 (Wash. App. 
1990). State v. La Roche, 442 A.2d 602 (N.H. 1982). 
Further, the statute states that the physician-patient 
privilege applies to civil actions. The statute excludes criminal 
proceedings. Further provision of the statute regarding privileged 
communications include the exclusion of testimony in criminal 
trials (see 78-24-8(5) Utah Code Ann). 
His further conversations related to an assessment of the 
defendant's physical condition (Tr. 12, 17). Paramedic Froerer 
also made lay observations relating to smell and strength of an 
odor of alcohol coming from the defendant (TR. 18, 19). 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT UNDER ARREST, NOR WAS PARAMEDIC 
FROERER AN AGENT OF THE POLICE REQUIRING 
ADVISEMENT OF THE DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN 
SILENT OR AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION 
Nowhere in the transcript does the issue of arrest or even 
the charge of driving under the influence appear. The testimony of 
Eric Froerer relates to his activities as a paramedic and emergency 
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medical technician. The Miranda decision relates to in-custodial 
interrogations of suspects by police personnel. Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S.436 (1966). There is no indication in the record 
before this court that Paramedic Froerer was an agent of the police 
nor investigating criminal conduct. Quite the contrary, Paramedic 
Froerer testified that his assignment was patient care (Tr. 10) . 
Failure by the defendant to support his claims by the record leave 
them as, "merely unsupported, unilateral allegation[s] which [the 
court] cannot resolve." Mark VII Fin. Consultants Co. v. Smedley, 
792 P.2d 130, 134 (Utah App. 1990). 
ARGUMENT 
THE PROVISIONS OF § 2 6-25-1 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
RELATING TO CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION RELEASE ARE 
NOT APPLICABLE TO PARAMEDIC FROERERfS TESTIMONY 
Defendant has argued that § 26-25-1 Utah Code Anno, 
precludes paramedic Froererfs testimony. The statute, according to 
§ 26-25-6 Utah Code Anno, indicates that the provisions of Chapter 
25 relating to communicable diseases as set forth in Chapter 25a of 
Title 26. This statute does not apply to the present case. No 
discussion was had regarding any communicable disease. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's ruling allowing the testimony of paramedic 
Froerer to the jury. Further, this court should affirm the 
defendantf s conviction. 
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Respectfully submitted this 10th day of May, 1993. 
Roy City Attorney 
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